I’ve been an occasional reader of Jacobin since the early days, but this past week I began reading founder Bhaskar Sunkara’s The Socialist Manifesto: The Case for Radical Politics in an Era of Extreme Inequality and I was intrigued by how his beginnings of a Socialist journey so mirrored my own. We are beneficiaries of Capitalist Andrew Carnegie’s (unintentional?) largess.
Americans know Carnegie primarily for his creation of 2,509 public libraries across the country like the Washington County Public Library where I recieved my first library card at around age 9 or 10 and discovered Karl Marx, Malcolm X, Hunter S. Thompson, Tom Wolfe and so, so much more. That would have been 1964-5 for me. For Sunkara those discoveries would have shortly after the end of the last millennium.
In the preface of his book he writes:
I discovered socialism largely by chance. My parents immigrated to the United States from Trinidad and Tobago with four children shortly before I was born… Like many middle-class kids before me, I found radicalism through books. My local library had heaps of socialist literature, most of them donated by red diaper babies and Jewish cultural associations. By chance I picked up a copy of Leon Trotsky’s My Life the summer after seventh grade, didn’t particularly like it (still don’t), but was sufficiently intrigued to read the Isaac Deutscher biographies of Trotsky, the works of democratic socialist thinkers including Michael Harrington and Ralph Miliband, and eventually the mysterious Karl Marx himself.
I began with Marx—no, I had no idea what the fuck I was reading at 14—but, like Sunkara, I was intrigued and I too began seeking out more contemporary authors at the end of the ’60s. All of this is to say that this morning I ended my freeloading days reading Jacobin and paid for an online subscription, in part, because I think that the subtitle of Sunkara’s book—The Case for Radical Politics in an Era of Extreme Inequality—is spot on.
The cover story for the current issue is by Jared Abbott and Dustin Guastella, writing in Blueprint for a Political Revolution and I’ve begun reading there. Abbott and Guastella lede:
For at least four decades now, workers have been steadily dropping out of party politics. In 1982, nearly half of all working-class voters identified as Democrats, but by 2018, that figure had fallen to less than a third, even as the Republican Party saw no uptick.
In response, the Democrats have attempted to supplement (and in some cases supplant) their traditional base with more and more middle-class professionals. As New York senator Chuck Schumer declared before the 2016 election, “For every blue-collar Democrat we lose in western Pennsylvania, we will pick up two moderate Republicans in the suburbs in Philadelphia.”
Schumer was disastrously wrong in that case, but the results of the 2018 midterm elections appeared to vindicate his “Fortress Fairfax” approach.
Both wings of the Pro-War Pro-Business party love the middle because the center is wishy-washy and easily manipulated PWPBians like Schumer understand that if they want to keep their cushy jobs, perqs and retirement cash from lobbying or serving on corporate boards they have to please their corporate masters.
The real message from 2018 was the success of women, minorities and millennials. Abbott and Guastella continue:
Today, the success of even far-left insurgencies is owed largely to the support of the young, educated, urban, and urbane. Democratic socialist freshman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez relied largely on mobilizing well-educated professionals in her upstart campaign.
Sean McElwee, cofounder of the think tank Data for Progress, goes as far as to urge left-wing campaigners to “Forget Trump voters,” on the grounds that “I can take someone who is deeply concerned about patriarchy and… make them understand how patriarchy intersects with capitalism much more than I can take someone who’s mad because GM took their job away and make them understand socialism.” In a similar fashion, the Working Families Party has increasingly relied on an affluent base in liberal metropoles. They scored a 2019 victory in Philadelphia by spending nearly a million dollars to mobilize voters almost exclusively in districts with a disproportionate number of young, highly educated residents. In these cases, despite a policy platform significantly to the left of the Democratic mainstream, even progressives are forced to rely on a middle-class professional constituency.
While this strategy can succeed in getting a few genuine leftists into office, it does little to counteract decades of working-class disenchantment with politics.
So, where do we go? Abbott and Guastella suggest that we not duplicate the strategy of Jeremy Corbyn:
The shocking collapse of Jeremy Corbyn’s 2019 election campaign can arguably be chalked up to the contradiction in class composition that [New York magazine writer Eric] Levitz identifies. Wedding middle-class liberals to a working-class base proved to be an unstable coalition. Corbyn, a lifelong Eurosceptic, couldn’t bring himself and his party to respect the Brexit referendum result, contributing to the loss of Labour’s historic strongholds across the Midlands and in the North of England.
Absent a strategy that can not only stop the bleeding of working-class voters but also attract a wide swath of working-class nonvoters, any left-wing insurgency will likely face its own version of Labour’s 2019 conundrum.
Of course, the Labour right has blamed the loss on the party’s radical manifesto, claiming that the Corbynistas were just too extreme for an essentially conservative working class. And similarly, the most common argument we hear from liberals opposed to Bernie Sanders—and by extension democratic socialism—is that his platform is simply “too liberal” for a majority of the US electorate.
However, as political scientists have argued for decades, it is less that Americans are particularly centrist on a right-to-left spectrum, and more that most simply don’t hold political beliefs that could be summarized coherently as either “liberal” or “conservative.” In other words, Americans tend to hold a range of positions that appear contradictory. And our candidates and political parties reinforce this by avoiding sharp ideological positions in favor of catchall slogans (“Morning in America,” “Hope and Change,” “Make America Great Again”).
Here, I think, after some 1,000 words the article gets to the core issue:
Even the term “liberal” has a strong negative connotation for lots of working-class voters, seen by many as little more than a commitment to smashing cultural norms. In a 2018 poll of some eight thousand Americans, 80 percent of respondents agreed that “political correctness is a problem in our country.” Such resounding skepticism of “PC culture” is held across all age and ethnic groups. So while a majority of Americans support a liberal culture—as indicated by broad support for religious, racial, ethnic, political, and sexual pluralism—an overwhelming number distrust the culture of liberalism.
In the rest of the article Abbott and Guastella make their case for a solution. This will not be a quick fix. We took more than a century to really screw this up and we might be decades more—if we all don’t roast or drown—to set the nation right again.
Bonus No. 1: Wait what’s that noise? Why it is BANDICOOT SEX NIGHT!
Bonus No. 2: Coronavirus: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver.
Bonus No. 3: No, I won’t vote for Joe Biden, the more civil fascist.
Bonus No. 4: Hasan Has A Pitch For Silicon Valley: The Cereal Stigma.
Bonus No. 5: Trump-style payback for Bernie.