
As an undergraduate at Ohio University I pursued a minor in Political Science with an emphasis on the then Soviet Union and fancied myself to be a budding Kremlinologist. One of my high points was calling Yuri Andropov as the next General Secretary of the Communist Party following the death of Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982. My classmates thought I was crazy (and I confess that my pick was probably a fluke since I didn’t see either Konstantin Chernenko or Michael Gorbachev coming) but I thought that the time was finally right for the KGB to wrest power from the party hacks. My appreciation for the Soviet secret service also greatly mitigated any surprise when in 1999 Russian President Boris Yeltsin elevated the former KGB officer Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin to the post of Prime Minister.
Putin’s term in power is second only to that of General Secretary Josef Stalin (31 Years) and shows no indications of ending in the foreseeable future. I don’t think most Americans have an appreciation for Putin and what he represents.
Glenn Greenwald does and his analysis or our institutional confusion in The New Yorker’s Big Cover Story Reveals Five Uncomfortable Truths About U.S. and Russia for The Intercept should only whet your understanding of what is happening in 2017. Greenwald begins:
The New Yorker is aggressively touting its 13,000-word cover story on Russia and Trump that was bylined by three writers, including the magazine’s editor-in-chief, David Remnick. Beginning with its cover image menacingly featuring Putin, Trump and the magazine’s title in Cyrillic letters, along with its lead cartoon dystopically depicting a UFO-like Red Square hovering over and phallically invading the White House, a large bulk of the article is devoted to what has now become standard—and very profitable—fare among East Coast news magazines: feeding Democrats the often-xenophobic, hysterical Russia-phobia for which they have a seemingly insatiable craving. Democratic media outlets have thus predictably cheered this opus for exposing “Russian President Vladimir Putin’s influence on the presidential election.”
But featured within the article are several interesting, uncomfortable, and often-overlooked facts about Putin, Trump and Democrats. Given that these points are made here by a liberal media organ that is vehemently anti-Trump, within an article dispensing what has become the conventional Democratic wisdom on Russia, it is well worth highlighting them.
Greenwald goes on to hit his five points:
1. Obama and Clinton have radically different views on Russia.
A major irony in the Democrats’ current obsession with depicting Putin as the world’s Grave Threat—and equating efforts to forge better relations with Moscow as some type of treason—is that it was Barack Obama who spent eight years accommodating the Russian leader and scorning the idea that Russia should be confronted and challenged. Indeed, Obama—after Russia annexed Crimea—rejected bipartisan demands to arm anti-Russian factions in Ukraine, and actively sought a partnership with Putin to bomb Syria. And, of course, in 2012—years after Russia invaded Georgia and numerous domestic dissidents and journalists were imprisoned or killed—the Obama-led Democrats mercilessly mocked Mitt Romney as an obsolete, ignorant Cold War relic for his arguments about the threat posed by the Kremlin.
Clinton, however, had a much different view of all this. She was often critical of Obama’s refusal to pursue aggression and belligerence in his foreign policy, particularly in Syria, where she and her closest allies wanted to impose a no-fly zone, be more active in facilitating regime change, and risk confrontation with Russia there. The New Yorker article describes the plight of Evelyn Farkas, the Obama Pentagon’s senior Russia advisor who became extremely frustrated by Obama’s refusal to stand up to Putin over Ukraine, but was so relieved to learn that Clinton, as President, would do so…
2. The risk of a new Cold War is very real and very dangerous.
The most astonishing aspect of the post-election discourse on Russia is how little attention is paid to the risks of fueling a new Cold War, let alone of military confrontation between the two nuclear-armed powers. A different New Yorker article in December, by Eric Schlosser, described how many times the two countries came quite close to nuclear annihilation in the past, and how easy it is now to trigger a nuclear exchange merely by miscommunication or misperception, let alone active belligerence…
3. The U.S. media refuses to say if we interfere in Russia’s domestic politics.
U.S. media accounts often note that “Putin believes” that the U.S. Government has repeatedly interfered in Russia’s political process. Given how often Putin publicly makes this claim, that’s hard to suppress. But what they almost never comment on is the rather significant question of whether Putin’s claims are true: does the U.S., in fact, try to manipulate Russian politics the way Russia now stands accused of interfering in the U.S. election?
The New Yorker article demonstrates how steadfastly this question is ignored…
4. The U.S. still has provided no evidence of Russian hacking.
That Putin ordered Russian hacking of the DNC’s and John Podesta’s emails in order to help Trump win is now such consecrated orthodoxy that it’s barely acceptable in Decent Company to question it. But that obscures, by design, the rather important fact that the U.S. Government, while repeatedly issuing new reports making these claims, has still never offered any actual evidence for them. Even the New Yorker article, which clearly views the theory as valid, acknowledges this fact… and (the most important point that Greenwald makes…
5. Fixating on Russia distract us from systemic failures of U.S. elites.
Denouncing the autocratic abuses of foreign adversaries such as Putin has long been the go-to tactic to distract attention from the failures and evils of U.S. actions—including the unpleasant fact that support for the world’s worst despots has long been, and continues to be, a central precept of U.S. policy. Or, as then-Secretary-of-State Hillary Clinton put it in 2009 about the decades-ruling Egyptian tyrant: “I really consider President and Mrs. Mubarak to be friends of my family. So I hope to see him often here in Egypt and in the United States.”
That Putin abuses the civic freedoms of Russians plainly answers none of the policy debates over Russia, given how ready and eager the U.S. is to align with the planet’s worst monsters. It’s instead designed to encourage Americans to fix their gaze on bad acts by people thousands of miles away in order to obfuscate the corruption of their own society and savagery by their own leaders. In several places, the New Yorker article warns against exploiting and inflating claims about Putin as a means of ignoring that the real causes of America’s problems reside not in Moscow but at home…
In his piece, Greenwald jumps to a 23 October 2016 interview by Tilo Jung of Noam Chomsky where Chomsky details how the United States pushed hard against Russia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. I recall a conversation I had in the mid-’80s in a barracks with a few of my fellow platform instructors at the Ohio Military Academy on the topic of the Russians. In that conversation the subject of how historically the United States has related to the Soviet Union came up. Only one of the other sergeants in the conversation knew that the United States had actually, albeit briefly and with little real force, invaded Russia in the 20th century.
We can argue about the importance of a brief military excursion that happened nearly a century ago, but, compare our own current jingoed rage to the real anger of Iranians and Chileans (just to mention two instances of interference) with our own meddling in their democratic processes.
What price are we paying?