Any student of American History understands the vital importance of free land. Free land is what made America great. Free land is why millions of emigrants left their ancestral homes and traveled thousands of miles to change their fortunes. America was great when borders were just lines on someone else’s maps. That lasted for about our first 100 years.
Making borders solid, building walls, is the opposite of making America great again.
(Please understand that I use the word free in free land fully recognizing that first peoples, as well as other European invaders occupied all the land that our government would later take by force and redistribute. Anyone disputing this view, please read Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States.)
Between 1848, the end of the Mexican-American war settled with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and 1963 with the Chamizal dispute, our southern border was literally fluid, set by the meanderings of the Rio Grande/Río Bravo del Norte. Our northern border with Canada has a longer history beginning with the 1783 Treaty of Paris and ending in with the eponymous Treaty of 1908. Historians will also tell you that we invaded both countries, more than once with the intent to push both borders back and make America even greater. Mexico and Canada (still part of Great Britain) weren’t having it and by the end of the 19th century, Manifest Destiny was a done deal.
William S. Burroughs is credited with the quote, “When you stop growing you start dying.” That is demonstrably true. There is no stasis for people or countries, and that scares the fuck out of a lot of Americans.
Francisco Cantú, writing in When the Frontier Becomes the Wall for The New Yorker, ledes:
On Election Day, 2018, residents of Nogales, Arizona, began to notice a single row of coiled razor wire growing across the top of the city’s border wall. The barrier has been a stark feature of the town’s urban landscape for more than twenty years, rolling up and over hilltops as it cleaves the American town from its larger, Mexican counterpart. But, in the weeks and months that followed, additional coils were gradually installed along the length of the fence by active-duty troops sent to the border by President Trump, giving residents the sense that they were living inside an occupied city. By February, concertina wire covered the wall from top to bottom, and the Nogales City Council passed a unanimous resolution calling for its removal. Such wire has only one purpose, the resolution declared—to harm or to kill. It is something “only found in a war, prison, or battle setting.”
Living in Tucson, barely an hour north of the border, I have become familiar with both sides of Nogales, crossing over the border to shop, attend meetings, take gifts or supplies to deported friends, or volunteer at a soup kitchen for migrants. In December, as I walked through the pedestrian crossing, I passed by uniformed soldiers transporting long ladders to one side of the port of entry, but I barely registered their significance. The militarization of the borderlands has become so commonplace that one often grows numb to its manifestations. It can seem distant until it reaches out to touch you. Only months later, as I watched images of the concertina wire proliferating on my social-media feeds, did I finally understand what those ladders had been for.
In “The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America” (Metropolitan), the historian Greg Grandin argues that America’s urge to wall off its borders marks the death of our most potent myth—the galvanizing vision of men and women seeking freedom along a vast frontier, a space for reinvention, unburdened by society, history, and one’s own past. Since the very inception of our country, he writes, the presence of a frontier has “allowed the United States to avoid a true reckoning with its social problems, such as economic inequality, racism, crime and punishment, and violence.” The ever-shifting and expanding frontier also acted as a physical barrier against invasion; as a national-security buffer against foreign enemies, Native Americans, and Mexicans; and as a tenuous escape valve for freed slaves, European migrants, and discontented laborers from crowded Eastern cities.
America was last great, was last growing, when we still had that tenuous escape valve. Cantú continues:
In The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America, the historian Greg Grandin argues that America’s urge to wall off its borders marks the death of our most potent myth—the galvanizing vision of men and women seeking freedom along a vast frontier, a space for reinvention, unburdened by society, history, and one’s own past. Since the very inception of our country, he writes, the presence of a frontier has “allowed the United States to avoid a true reckoning with its social problems, such as economic inequality, racism, crime and punishment, and violence.” The ever-shifting and expanding frontier also acted as a physical barrier against invasion; as a national-security buffer against foreign enemies, Native Americans, and Mexicans; and as a tenuous escape valve for freed slaves, European migrants, and discontented laborers from crowded Eastern cities.
…By the dawn of the twentieth century, with Native Americans dwindling in number and largely relegated to reservations, the frontier had been fully transformed into something romantic and beckoning—an entire way of life. It became, Grandin writes, “a state of mind, a cultural zone, a sociological term of comparison, a type of society, an adjective, a noun, a national myth, a disciplining mechanism, an abstraction, and an aspiration.” For the dominant white culture, the word meant freedom.
The frontier also provided a new way of understanding American identity, history, and politics. At the end of the nineteenth century, the historian Frederick Jackson Turner announced his “frontier thesis”—the idea that, in his words, “the existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward explain American development.” American identity hinged upon its perpetual expansion. Our democracy, Turner wrote, “came out of the American forest and it gained strength each time it touched a new frontier.” Expansion was thus a fundamental good and an integral part of what set us apart from Europe—it was the very thing that made America great. But on the frontier, Grandin reminds us, settlers won greater freedom for themselves only by “putting down people of color, and then continuing to define their liberty in opposition to the people of color they put down.”
“The End of the Myth” aims, in part, to reposition race-based violence to the center of the frontier narrative, exposing it as foundational to today’s “border brutalism.”
(That myth has driven Hollywood for more than a century as noted by Randall Munroe in Westerns.)
When we could no longer spread our real borders, we did what every country in history has done, we turned from nation building to empire building. Cantú begins the second section of his piece this way:
As settlement supplanted America’s physical frontier, a new project arose to extend Manifest Destiny beyond its former geographic limits. American imperialism provided the opportunity for “a new revolution,” Woodrow Wilson declared in 1901, a little more than a decade before ascending to the Presidency. During the Spanish-American War of 1898 and ensuing military campaigns in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua, Americans had, in Wilson’s view, “made new frontiers for ourselves beyond the seas.” This form of expansion allowed a nation still recovering from the Civil War and Reconstruction to channel its aggression outward once more. Former Confederate soldiers were able to don the uniform of a newly unified country and earn patriotic recognition while still fighting to exert racial superiority over people of color. Letters sent home by soldiers enlisted in these campaigns, Grandin tells us, “are notably similar, lightheartedly narrating to family and friends how they would shoot ‘niggers,’ lynch ‘niggers,’ release ‘niggers’ into the swamp to die. . . .” Like those who had collected Native American scalps first as mercenaries and then as soldiers, these men learned that America’s new frontier was a place that could legitimatize a racist thirst for violence.
All of this more than academic for Cantú:
Because I served as a Border Patrol agent, from 2008 to 2012, Grandin’s account brought up more personal memories for me as well. Despite its white-supremacist roots, the Border Patrol has evolved into an agency where more than half of its members are of Latinx descent. Just as the military has long promised social mobility to immigrants and minority populations, the Border Patrol provides rare access to financial security and the privileges of full citizenship, especially for those living in rural border communities. In America, even at the individual level, citizenship politics often wins out over identity politics.
From there Cantú brings his experiences home:
As a member of the patrol, I never witnessed anything as straightforwardly depraved as the beatings, torture, rape, and murder Grandin describes. But I often heard romanticized stories of “the old patrol,” a lament for the days when agents had free rein across the borderlands, lighting abandoned cars on fire and “tuning up” smugglers and migrants at will. As young trainees, my colleagues and I were taken to storied places in the desert—a remote pass where earlier generations of agents were rumored to have pushed migrants from clifftops and hidden their corpses, a stretch of road where an agent had run over a Native American lying drunk and asleep on the road, an isolated patch of scrubland where agents had force-fed smugglers fistfuls of marijuana and turned them loose to walk through the wilderness barefoot and stripped to their underwear.
The forms of violence that I observed and was complicit in were subtler—the destruction of food and water caches, a pervasive attitude of dismissal and neglect, a persistent use of dehumanizing slurs. Grandin’s description of a McAllen, Texas, police force that came together in the nineteen-eighties to gleefully watch highlights of brutal interrogation sessions of migrants called to my mind a day when a senior officer burst into the computer room where I was gathered with a group of junior agents. He interrupted our work to project onto a screen at the front of the room photographs of a body he had just encountered in the desert. In the images, he was squatting, with two thumbs up and a broad smile, beside a dead man whose flesh had rotted from his bones after months under the unforgiving sun. It was meant to be, as Grandin observes about the videos of the McAllen interrogation sessions, “a bonding ritual used to initiate new recruits.”
Part of Grandin’s achievement in “The End of the Myth” is to situate today’s calls to fortify our borders in relation to the centuries of racial animus that preceded them. Donald Trump can be distinguished from his predecessors, Grandin argues, because of his willingness to meet conservative and nativist demands at their logical end point—by closing off instead of moving out. By contrast, his predecessors over the past four decades each found ways of channelling aggression outward by identifying new frontiers and promising boundlessness in a shrinking world. Reagan pursued anti-Communist wars in Central America by declaring it “our southern frontier”; George H. W. Bush saw the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and imagined “new markets for American products,” proclaiming that “in the frontiers ahead, there are no borders”; Clinton declared, as he signed NAFTA, that “this new global economy is our new frontier”; and George W. Bush launched a global war on terror with the promise to “extend the frontiers of freedom.” After America’s military failure in Iraq and its economic failure in the Great Recession, the nation’s first African-American President arrived in office at the precise moment when hatred was coming home from the fringes.
With Trump—the first President since the dawn of American imperialism to renounce the Turnerian call for rejuvenation through expansion—“America finds itself at the end of its myth,” Grandin asserts, and is finally being forced to confront “extremism turned inward, all-consuming and self-devouring.” The idea of the border wall has thus replaced the myth of American limitlessness, Grandin concludes, serving as “a monument to the final closing of the frontier.” For all that, Trump’s pledge to erect a “big, beautiful wall,” from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean, serves many of the same purposes as the earlier expansionist rhetoric—the border remains abstract in the minds of most Americans, yet it represents a problem and a promise distinct enough to distract from more immediate and enduring social ills. A completed border wall, and the victory it would represent to many, is thus conveniently unattainable, allowing for the same fleeing forward that has always tugged at American history. After all, as Grandin shrewdly observes, “the point isn’t to actually build ‘the wall’ but to constantly announce the building of the wall.”
In the thesis sentence for his concluding paragraph, Cantú writes:
What makes the wall terrifying to so many who live along the border is, in part, the way it serves as an inescapable reminder of the brutalities and injustices that have long been unleashed upon the frontier. The very presence of a barrier represents a profound psychological, political, ecological, cultural, and spatial reordering.
Walls serve two, sometimes unequal but always simultaneous, functions: The keep some out and some in. We may argue one over the other, but we must consider and accept Cantú’s profound psychological, political, ecological, cultural, and spatial reordering.
I’ve crossed many borders many times. For most of them I needed only my driver’s license or my military ID. I didn’t even own a passport until around 1988 when I took a business trip to The Dominican Republic. If we acquiesce to erecting physical barriers we will only succeed in cutting off our own national oxygen.
Some 150 years ago we fought an bloody internal war to transform ourselves from a people where The United of America are to The United States of America is. That transition pissed off a lot of people. In many ways, I think they’re still pissed.
Bonus No. 1: One of the important, for me, aspects of reading The New Yorker is educational for me as a writer. Not only do I get to read the best writing, but I also get to continuously expand my vocabulary. Reading Peter Schjeldahl’s Joan Miró’s Modernism for Everybody was like that. I didn’t mark and particular part of the piece for consideration, but I did highlight a number of the words Schjeldahl used, beginning with this sentence: Neither of us had studied art history. We thirsted not for knowledge, which might have involved attending morning classes after talking all night, but for glory of some inchoate kind. Other words included:
I would soon drop out of school and work my way east, as a newspaper reporter, with a mad conviction that I knew what awaited me, a tyro snob, lacking only proper opinions.
But esteeming Miró proved more than O.K., because he figured as a major prophet of Abstract Expressionism, still the cynosure of American greatness, which felt like a birthright to me.
and:
His synthesis of painting and sculpture, being sui generis, had not led to developments by subsequent artists.
Ah, words…