The New Republic Online

HOW NOT TO HALT THE DARFUR GENOCIDE.
Low Pressure

by Marisa Katz

Only at TNR Online
Post date: 12.29.05

This week Barack Obama and Sam Brownback took to the op-ed page of The Washington Post to implore the Bush administration to end the Darfur genocide. Their sentiment is admirable. Yet the violence in Darfur has been going on for so long now that it takes a lot to get people’s attention.

And unfortunately the senators don’t make much of an effort. They retread the same old banal appeals to decency, they go out of their way to couch any hint of criticism in diplomatic politesse, and they ensure their most meaningful idea is lost in a long list of proposals. It’s a perfect example of how not to halt a genocide.

The senators warn that “If the United States does not change its approach to Darfur, an already grim situation is likely to spiral out of control.” One could argue that the situation has been “out of control” for some time now, given that hundreds of thousands have already died. But, that point aside, vague moral appeals to take action in Darfur no longer have much currency.

The warnings have been issued so many times that the sense of urgency is gone. Moreover, the West seems somehow to have overcome its guilt. The killing continues. Our way of life continues. And unless calls to do something about Darfur can be presented in a way that destabilizes our sense of complacency, they will continue to be tuned out.

Obama and Brownback actually further this complacency by lauding the Bush administration’s efforts in Darfur as “commendable.” As evidence, they cite Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s four trips “to the region” in the past seven months. Of course, the content of such trips is more important than the simple fact that he went.

And, in the past seven months, Zoellick often has been tasked not with putting pressure on the government in Khartoum but with rewarding it–for its cooperation on a separate peace deal with Christians in the south. Obama and Brownback suggest that the accord was expected to “change Khartoum’s stance on Darfur.” But that was always wishful thinking.

The agreement, while a promising step for southern Sudan, has on balance worsened the situation in Darfur: It gives the Sudanese government leverage to fend off Western demands that it halt the killing, while making the United States reluctant to intervene forcefully for fear of endangering the progress that has already been made in the south.

This tension isn’t acknowledged in Obama and Brownback’s narrative. In fact, they don’t admit any shortfalls in our Darfur strategy to date. Instead, they are careful to note that it is because of “new and mounting challenges” that we must now change course. For instance, they write, “it has become clear in recent weeks that [the African Union monitoring force] lacks the resources and manpower to secure a region the size of France.”

Please. Human rights advocates have been making that very claim–right down to the size comparison–since the force was first authorized. The A.U. troops have always lacked the numbers, the equipment, and the mandate to effectively control violence in Darfur.

It’s a predicament Congress willfully ignored last month when it voted to cut the $50 million that lawmakers had approved for the A.U. earlier in the year. But Obama and Brownback don’t bother to criticize their colleagues for this shameful move. And by implying that the A.U. force was once sufficient, they undermine their authority on the issue.

And that’s too bad, because they actually have some proposals worth considering. Most importantly, they want to send Western troops to Darfur. “It has become clear that a U.N.- or NATO-led force is required, and the administration must use diplomacy to override Chinese and Sudanese opposition to such a force and persuade outside troops to join it,” they write.

That’s a pretty big deal coming from members of Congress. But, reading the op-ed, the proposal could easily be missed. Not only is it buried in paragraph eight, it gets lost among a long list of recommendations. Certainly it’s important to “keep up the pressure on the rebels to unite their negotiating positions” and to place “additional pressure on key nations — Chad, Eritrea and Libya — to stop playing a destructive role in the conflict.”

But these are neither necessary nor sufficient steps to ending the violence. By contrast, NATO troops with a strong mandate could clamp down on Khartoum’s abuses, separate the combatants, and help the more than one million displaced people start returning to their homes. This is the most controversial proposal Obama and Brownback have to offer. But ultimately, it may be the only realistic chance we have of stopping the genocide.

So credit the two senators with a bold proposal. Unfortunately, by presenting their suggestions with less than urgent language, by refusing to deal honestly with our past failures in Darfur, and by burying the one idea that could really make a difference–and that involves the toughest moral tradeoffs–they have almost certainly guaranteed that their op-ed will be lost in the din.

Marisa Katz is an assistant editor at TNR.