Previously: CLEVELAND “SOLVED” ITS PROBLEMS BY AVOIDING… —PART ONE.
Cleveland survived the tough and tragic 1960s as violence subsided. But the city hardly returned to “good times’” Rather it faced problems of significant population decline, job losses and a return to caretaker and corrupt governing at City Hall.
Ralph Perk, with the support of a young councilman, became the 52nd mayor. The councilman was Dennis Kucinich, who awaited his time to depose Perk. It marked the comeback of white ethnic control of City Hall and to Republican hands.
Former Mayor Carl Stokes tried to maintain some control by trying to elect one of his top aides, Arnold Pinkney. His attempt failed.
The 1970s were to prove unkind to Cleveland.
Between 1960 and 1980, the city lost more than 300,000 in population. An incredible number for a city that had 750,000 inhabitants when I came here in 1965. Poverty was rising to 40 percent and job losses, a report noted, cost 62,000 factory jobs.
No wonder a popular car bumper began to adorn autos: “Cleveland—You Gotta Be Tough.” It signaled the depressed nature of the times.
Perk was essentially an old fashioned, keep-taxes-low politician. He had come to politics by default. His father had run a business selling ice and to keep peace with politicians one son was assigned to the Democratic Party and the other, Ralph, the Republican Party.
This caretaker mayoral time was plagued with revenue needs. However, Perk shared power with the Democratic council president. George Forbes, indeed, often seemed to be the go-to guy. Early in the ’80s, Forbes got his council to gag itself by eliminating a period at meeting for members to speak out on any subject they desired. They gagged themselves. Forbes’ power was magnified.
Business leaders relaxed as the new pair ruled. Violent protests declined. City hall had a taint of organized crime but that didn’t seem to bother the establishment.
Perk, faced with financial problems, began a selloff of city assets. Parks were turned over to the State of Ohio for $32 million, money Perk quickly spent.
The city sewer system was regionalized; the city’s transit system, valued at $70 million, became a stand-alone agency with payoff to the city. The city’s port facilities also shifted to a stand-alone authority.
Still burdened by lack of finances, Perk began spending bond money on general city needs. It was clear he still needed money to make up his shortfall.
It appeared he was ready to unload one more city asset: the municipal electric system, known as Muny Light. In addition, Perk—to satisfy business desires and update downtown—got behind a new tax abatement program.
These moves did not bother council president Forbes. He was close to the business community and its desires.
However, the combination of the possible sale of Muny Light and tax abatement of property taxes for downtown development gave Kucinich twin issues to pursue his desire to be mayor. The first abatements were given National City Bank for its new, long-desired headquarters at E. 9th and Euclid. Another went to Standard Oil of Ohio (later BP) for a site behind Tower City. It later moved the site and lost the abatement.
Kucinich, who left council to serve as city clerk of courts, must have watched with joy. Perk, he felt, was digging himself into a hole and Dennis could bury him. He was ready for a 1977 rise to power.
At the time, however, a third candidate took stage. Edward Feighan, a state representative. The non-party primary surprisingly ended with Perk being odd man out. This left Kucinich and Feighan, both Democrats, in the general election. Kucinich prevailed.
Kucinich, who at 31 became the youngest mayor of a major American city, received national attention, pushing his progressive ideas. “You may have noticed that I didn’t touch on any of the great debates over social issues. The basis of genuine reform is economic reform,” he explained his view to a national audience.
Cleveland entered one of its most explosive two-year mayoral terms in its history. Kucinich was under constant pressure, having to endure at least two crucial elections before running for re-elections in 1979. He survived a brutal recall election and a bitter fight to maintain Muny Light as a city asset. He won both but lost to Republican George Voinovich in 1979.
NOW, the corporate community had the city hall it wanted—Voinovich as mayor and Forbes as council president. Voinovich had proclaimed, “I like Fat Cats.”
Indeed, as the business leaders had formed mechanisms to guide their way during the 1960s, they used other methods to rid themselves of Kucinich and get the political leaders they desired.
Perk had been misspending bond money but Cleveland banks had consistently rolled over the city’s short-term borrowing. The issue was clouded by the desire of the electric company to take over Muny Light. U.S. Judge Robert Krupansky had allowed city properties to be red tagged for debt payment, forcing Kucinich to pay some $15 million to CEI, the private company. The mayor now faced a bank payment of some $14.5 million and couldn’t pay. The Cleveland Trust bank refused to rollover the debt and the city went into historic default on Dec. 15, 1978. Kucinich claimed the banks offered to roll the debt if he promised to sell Muny Light to CEI.
Kucinich did allow a city vote on whether to keep Muny Light. In a bitter battle, city voters elected to keep the asset.
This was a classic battle of government vs private interests. CEI had been pursuing a policy of squeezing Muny by refusing the “wheel”—that is transport its power to the city in certain circumstances. CEI surrounded Muny Light territory and could and did block the city from other energy sources. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission noted in November that CEI was still “pursuing anti-competitive and deceptive” acts against the city’s system. It charged CEI was “acting like a spoiled child.” Kucinich pushed a $325-million anti-trust suit against CEI. For a detailed exam:

It took two federal jury trials, one a hung jury and the other against the city, to end the suit. It rolled over into the Voinovich era. Voinovich, concerned of Kucinich’s still powerful pull, pursued the anti-trust case. Judge Krupansky, who had backed CEI’s claims in red tagging city property, showed clear bias against the city during the two trials.
Just how badly the Cleveland corporate establishment wanted to rid itself of Kucinich was revealed in a Fortune Magazine article a decade later. The corporate leaders didn’t hide behind civic mechanisms or committees as in the 1960s. But they hid their actions.
The article was entitled: “How Business Bosses Saved a Sick City.” Some of the claims were rather blunt. Jack Reavis was not on the scene anymore, but Jones-Day remained in the driver’s seat. Dick Pogue, Jones-Day managing partner, played the role now.
“In a sense Kucinich was the best thing that ever happened because he became a unifying element. People looked at him and said, ‘Enough is enough here. Let’s get together and change things.”
It was war. The story continued: ”E. Mandel deWindt, the now retired CEO of Eaton Corp., and the unofficial dean of businessmen, organized the troops and devised a strategy, setting in motion a benign conspiracy of executives and entrepreneurs that still operates. The impressive feat of organizing that cabal and persuading Cleveland’s most senior businessmen to take charge of the grittiest aspects of civic life was key to the town’s turnabout.” It was, in essence, a coup.
Finally, the corporate bosses had the city leadership team it long desired.
Though Voinovich was cautious. He moved slowly at first. It seemed he still feared the shadow of Kucinich. He played it very cautiously for a time. He continued to city’s suit against CEI and supported Muny Light. He, however, change the name of the city’s system to Cleveland Public Power.
The corporate coup wasn’t wasted.
Voinovich and Forbes cooperated in massive government subsidizing. Not for the city’s heavily poor population. It was the corporate community rewarding itself.
Cleveland qualified for a federal loan program for urban action grants (UDAG). It earned the right because of Cleveland’s high poverty rate. The money, however, went to developers. Under Voinovich developer Dick Jacobs received two $20 million UDAGs at zero interest. In addition, Voinovich, with Forbes’ help, bestowed 20-year, full 100% tax abatements for two major bank buildings and two hotels. The value: $250,000,000. One set of buildings was constructed. The other never made it but presently will house the heavily subsidized Sherwin-Williams new headquarters.
Further UDAGs flowed out of city hall. Tower City, four properties, got $23.9 million and the Ritz Carleton, $7.9 million, plus tax abatement worth $35.5 million. Up Euclid Ave. the restoration of the Halle building drew $28 million in UDAG and other loans. The Galleria got a $3.5 million UDAG.
Playhouse Square joined the UDAG parade with $6.3 million for a number of spots. In addition, the Square’s real estate interests got various loans and grants for the Wyndham hotel: $8 million in block grant funds and a state loan; a $3.1 million TIF grant and an $13 million tax abatement. Across the way, the Renaissance Building received a $7.7 million property tax abatement.
Nothing was built or renewed without these generous outlays.
One more project was high on the corporate list. They wanted a rock ‘n roll connection to add to the downtown revival. In short, the city worked to lure the New York Rock Hall interests to Cleveland. Successfully. What did it cost – a bundle. The Rock & Roll Hall and Museum, located on city land on Lake Erie rose in cost to some $90 million, all locally financed with further abatement at Tower City and a dedicated increased city admissions tax.
But that wasn’t all. The powers that be forced the Regional Transit System to build a rapid train expressly from Tower City to the Rock museum’s doorstep. It was a Dick Pogue special. Since he wanted it quickly, RTA didn’t apply for federal matching funds because it would have cause delays. The 2.2 mile run cost some $70-million, all local funds. It has been a major revenue loser ever since.
For a comprehensive list of how generous Cleveland has been to developers, please see
ROLDO RIGHTS ON BOX SCORES FOR DOWNTOWN… However, these deals were eclipsed by a real estate scheme with payoffs to both Voinovich and Forbes.
Almost a century before, Tom Johnson, the famed Cleveland Progressive Mayor, had foresight to buy control of a huge amount of real estate outside the city. Stokes had wanted to use the real estate to build a “new city,” a housing development that would be integrated. In a deposition Forbes was asked about low income housing for this area. “No,” he said, “Because I had concluded that we had reached a stage where that would never happen…” Sometimes, power has its limits. But it didn’t seem Forbes expended much for low income needs.
Voinovich, Forbes and other interests had other plans. The property – labeled “without doubt one of the finest pieces of real estate between New York City and Chicago” – was to be used to lure a corporation that had left the area back here. However, a lawsuit, later dropped, helped reveal the truth. The development, known as Chagrin Highlands, ended up in the hands of the late Dick Jacobs, a favorite of Forbes. Voinovich’s old law firm, Calfee-Halter, also had a connection. The area, in suburbs outside Cleveland, now houses a number of Cleveland entities, including Eaton Corp., lured from downtown, and an offshoot of University Hospitals.
For the decades 1980 through 1990s the Corporates had their way with cooperative mayors – Voinovich, through to 1990 and Michael White from there to 2002. White in a historic 1989 election defeated Forbes. The two had survived a hotly contested primary. It was the first time two Black candidate faced each other.
White campaigned in a manner that suggested deep concern for Cleveland’s poor and needy community. He lived for a time with a public housing family, and rode the public transportation system. It proved to be fake concern. He criticized a “two-tier” economy. The city’s agenda tilted more to downtown.
White, along with Cuyahoga County Commissioners, pushed a tax for sports facilities that was to outdo all other revival efforts. Promises were made; promises were not kept.
A series of sin taxes was proposed for construction of a major league baseball stadium and basketball arena. City residents rejected and county supported the measure. Hundreds of millions of dollars were proposed to pay bonds for the facilities. All regressive taxes. Among many other promises, White assured voters there would be no tax abatement. Then he went to Columbus to successfully urge full property tax exemption for the two facilities and for another stadium for the Cleveland Browns, constructed with Cleveland funds alone. More millions in subsidies.
The sports facilities continue to drain city resources. Now abatements have become expected, though are mostly a different form, saving schools revenue loss. The 15 and 20 year duration has now jumped to a possible 60 years.
When Sherwin-Williams, a major paint company located in Cleveland, decided it need new headquarters it chose one of the old UDAG spots also given tax abatement. The company is expected to receive some $100 million from the city plus other subsidies from Cuyahoga County and the State of Ohio.
Inequality is baked into city policies. The party continues.
